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Abstract 
This paper is the first attempt to estimate the hydroelectricity rent in Italy, as several concessions are about to 
expire, and the first to analyze the implications of different redistribution mechanisms. Due to budgetary constraints, 
local authorities want to capture a higher part of the rent, thought to be considerable. At the same time, the renewal 
procedure entails the implementation of environmental mitigation measures, as set forth in the water framework 
directive. Hence, rent-seizing and environmental protection generate a major trade-off. We focus our analysis on the 
County of Sondrio, home to 18% of the overall hydropower capacity, where the first renewals will take place. We 
obtain the highest rent ever estimated for hydropower production, averaging from 30.3 €/MWh to 82.4 €/MWh. 
These high values explain why local authorities are pushing for the introduction of a 30% revenue sharing fee, as they 
would earn almost 90% of the rent, much more than the 50% currently seized. Albeit satisfying the rentseizing 
objective, the proposed fee hinders the implementation of costly mitigation measures. In this paper, we advocate the 
adoption of a resource rent tax, as we show that it would reduce the trade-off between rent-seizing and 
environmental protection. 
1. Introduction 
After nearly one century, Italy is in the process of reforming the institutional background of its hydroelectricity (HE) 
sector. Many things changed since 1933, when the first discipline was introduced. HE is not anymore the sole nor the 
most important source of energy; even if its share has declined to about 15% of the total, however, it still remains 
strategic for the power balance and for the contribute to the production from renewable sources. New societal 
demands have arisen with respect to water, including environmental protection, ecological restoration, recreation and 
landscape. These circumstances determine the case for a substantial change in the patterns of apportioning of the 
economic rents generated by HE. Until now, these have been shared between HE producers, government and local 
communities in the absence of precise data and studies, favouring the emergence of a fuzzy public debate, in which 
each actor claims for a higher share of the pie and blames the others for receiving too much.  
The present study offers two contributions to the debate. First, it estimates the magnitude of the HE rent. We focus 
on a case study area, the County of Sondrio, hosting 18% of the total HE installed capacity. To our knowledge, this is 
the first attempt in this direction in the Italian context; even at an international level the existing literature is rather 
scarce.  
Secondly, it discusses alternative mechanisms for apportioning the economic rent and the incentives that these 
different mechanisms provide to foster a transition to a more sustainable HE sector, with particular reference to 
environmental mitigation measures. The present one, based on a royalty calculated as a function of nominal 
production, is compared with two alternatives: a royalty based on actual turnover and a resource rent tax calculated 
as a function of the net economic rent, similar to the one adopted in Norway. 
As for the fi rst issue, our study shows that HE generates a significant rent, which averages from 30.3 € /MWh to 
82.4 € /MWh, which corresponds to 0.94– 1.57 billion euro per year at the national scale (0.1% of the GDP). These are 
the highest values ever estimated for the HE rent across several countries.  
As for the second issue, we show how the current fee system is inefficient both in terms of rent seizing and in 
promoting a transition to a more environmentally friendly HE sector. By contrast, both the proportional system and 
the RRT perform well in terms of rent seizing, as the slice that would accrue to the State would be 90% and 75% 
respectively. However, the latter scheme is the only one that automatically deducts from its taxable base all the 
investments, including those in environmental mitigation measures.  
Consequently, we demonstrate that only an RTT scheme solves the trade-off between environmental sustainability 
and rent seizing.  
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we start with a short theoretical introduction regarding the 
economic concept of rent, its function in the resource allocation process, its sharing options. We then provide some 
background information on the HE sector in Italy and in the County of Sondrio, our case-study area. Sections 3 and 4 
outline the main results, while Section 5 is devoted to policy implications and recommendations arising from the 
study. 
2. Background and methodology 
2.1 Hydroelectricity and rent generation: some stylized facts 
The economic attractiveness of HE depends on three main characteristics. First, HE is cheap, in particular once 
investment costs have been recovered (IEA et al., 2010; Larsson et al., 2014; Hall et al., 2003). Secondly, HE is a cost-
effective balancing technology, possibly the sole renewable with such a capability, as it allows meeting different load 
profiles (Førsund, 2012). Finally, HE is flexible, since production can be adapted to effective demand (Edwards, 2003).  
HE production depends on the availability of a usable water flow. This can simply be the natural run-of-the-river, but 
in this case, the natural variability through seasons and years would condition production potential. However, 
upstream water storage facilities may regulate flows and guarantee a much more stable and reliable production 
(Edwards, 2003). Moreover, since water release from upstream allows activation in real time and at zero cost, HE is 
particularly suitable for production in peak periods.  
Both reasons make the production from regulated outflows much more lucrative in principle – though obviously the 
cost of upstream facilities should also be accounted for. Contrary to several other renewable sources, water is an 
excludible good, in the sense that it is generally not possible to use the same water in the same place more than once. 
Sometimes it is possible to use a water flow in a sequential way, or share it for uses that are not mutually exclusive 
(e.g. water used for generating HE can be later used for irrigation): but these possibilities are ultimately finite. 
Moreover, suitable sites for building reservoirs are limited by geographical, environmental and social factors, thus the 
development of further facilities is extremely difficult and costly, at least for large storage plants and especially in 
developed 
countries (Ansar et al., 2014). 
This circumstance represents the pre-condition for the existence of an economic scarcity rent, a situation that 
descends from the combination of exclusive rights and non-reproducible scarce resources (Amundsen and Andersen, 
1992). According to the Economist's online glossary, the concept of rent in economics identifies “the difference 
between what a factor of production is paid and how much it would need to be paid to remain in its current use”. 
More precisely, it corresponds to the surplus value accruing to the owner of a resource, on top of the long-run 
marginal costs of supplying it. The market value of a factor of production depends on the market price of the most 
valuable alternative output that could be obtained using that same factor as an input; while the long-run marginal cost 
corresponds to operational and capital costs, the latter including depreciation of assets and the opportunity cost of 
financial resources that have been anticipated. In a perfectly competitive market, marginal cost and price tend to 
converge, since the existence of a positive gap encourages new suppliers to enter: this is precisely what cannot 
happen when neither reproduction nor substitution of an essential input are feasible, thence impeding entry of new 
suppliers. Hence, a rent can stem from differences in quality of factors of production or from scarcity. In the HE case, 
the total rent is normally given by the sum of three different types of rent (see Rothman, 2000, for a more thorough 
discussion): 
• Differential rent among HE sites.  
• Scarcity rent, as the restricted availability of water makes it impossible to produce electricity only with HE. 
• Technological rent, as it is cheaper than other production technologies. 
According to this definition, a surplus value can accrue to HE producers even in perfectly competitive markets, as 
there can be intrinsically different production costs that characterize each individual supplier. Fig. 1 illustrates how all 
three types of rent can happen simultaneously: since it is not possible to expand HE production beyond HEmax, the 
supply curve becomes vertical. In case no alternative technology exists, the price would jump to p1, and the scarcity 
rent would be the area ABEF. In case it is possible to produce electricity with some other technique (more costly than 
HE), this latter cost will determine the market price (pn), leaving the scarcity rent equal to CDEF. 
 
2.2 Rent estimation: methods and applications 
While the concept of HE rent is straightforward, its practical determination is diffi cult, since normally neither the 
market price nor the costs are readily observable in the context of regulated electricity markets (Rothman, 2000). In a 
liberalized market, prices are actually available; however, getting information about costs may be even more difficult, 
given that companies are arguably more reluctant to share data.  
Costs can either come from annual reports (Gillen and Wen, 2000; Banfi et al., 2005) or can be estimated 
(Amundsen and Tjøtta, 1993). The former approach has the advantage of relying on actual data; however, such 
information is difficult to obtain for single facilities. In most cases, power companies own a varied set of facilities and 
technologies, and it is not possible to break down HE facilities alone. Moreover, historical costs may be biased by 
operational inefficiency, which is more likely to take place in costbased regulated industries. Banfi and Filippini (2010) 
argue that Swiss companies' costs are on average 19% higher than the efficient cost frontier. Parametric functions can 
replace actual historical costs and revenues. While this allows keeping the estimate free of inefficiency, it neglects 
site-specific factors that influence both costs and productivity in each site. Many reference studies report significant 
variability of both investment and operational costs for HE sites; this variability cannot be easily connected to readily 
measurable characteristics of each site (Førsund, 2007; IEA et al., 2010; IRENA, 2012; Hall et al., 2003). Moreover, 
parametric estimates cannot reflect the cost of actions that companies undertake in order to improve environmental 
performance.  
Since HE costs depend on investments that date back to a long time before, a further difficulty concerns the need to 
update the asset value, which might not only mean to adjust for inflation, since in the meanwhile costs may have 
changed, for example because of tighter environmental or safety requirements (Ansar et al., 2014).  
In order to estimate total revenues in the lack of unbundled historical records for each facility, one could start from 
production volumes and real competitive prices for electricity, possibly breaking them down in order to consider 
peak/load issues (Banfi et al., 2005). In case such market does not exists, proxies may be long-run backstop 
technologies (Amundsen and Tjøtta, 1993) or bilateral long-term prices (Gillen and Wen, 2000). Actual historical 
production may be proxied by parametric estimates of the production potential; however, limitations are similar to 
those of parametric costs, due to site-specific variables and the trade-off between environmental impact and 
productivity.  
Other less conventional sources of revenue should as well be considered from the viewpoint of developers. For 
example, HE plants may be entitled towards direct and indirect subsidies that many states recognize that renewable 
energy sources. In many EU countries, this possibility concerns new facilities, particularly small ROR ones; sometimes 
(e.g. in Germany) already existing facilities may negotiate with water authorities environmental improvements in 
exchange for the assimilation to renewables (Mattheiss,2011). From a social cost-benefit perspective, revenues arising 
from incentives and subsidies are clearing entries; in turn, society benefits from the associated positive externalities.  
Furthermore, HE production is often associated to large water management projects that also support other 
valuable functions (e.g. flood protection, irrigation, drinking water supply). From a social perspective, this makes it 
more difficult to estimate HE rents, since costs have to be shared and/or best alternatives for providing these 
functions should be considered (Rothman, 2000) (Table 1.) 
The applied economic literature on the subject is surprisingly thin. The few published studies concern Canada 
(Zucker and Jenkins, 1984), Norway (Amundsen and Tjøtta, 1993) and Switzerland (Banfi et al., 2005). They all adopt a 
combination of the above approaches, and find that HE generates a significant rent (see Table 1). This is quite 
remarkable, given that the generation mix in all these Countries is cost effective: in Canada, 60% of the electricity is 
produced with HE, another 30% with nuclear and coal; in Norway almost 99% of the electricity is produced with hydro; 
in Switzerland, HE accounts for 58% and nuclear for almost 40%. As the Italian generation mix relies a lot more on 
fossil fuels, with HE covering only about 15%, we expect therefore that the higher variable cost is reflected in a higher 
value of the economic rent 
 
2.3 Rent extraction 
The economic literature on water pricing provides little support on rent extraction mechanisms, since it has mostly 
focused on issues like (i) the allocation of scarce water resources among competing uses, (ii) internalization of 
externalities, e.g. caused by pollution and (ii) cost recovery of water services (Griffin, 2006; Hanemann, 2006). More 
useful insights for our issue come instead from the literature in the field of exhaustible resources (Heaps and Helliwell, 
1985) as well in that of land and urban development (Foldvary, 2005). Theorists of natural resource economics tend to 
attribute a positive allocation function to the scarcity rent, since it represents a measure of the opportunity cost. If the 
price of the scarce resource would be lower, inefficient allocation of resources would arise (Harris and Roach, 2013). 
Accounting for the scarcity cost ensures that the scarce resource accrues to the most valuable uses. From another 
angle, however, the rent constitutes an unjustified “unearned income”, providing an argument in favor of the 
appropriation of scarce resources by the State, or at least for a substantial seizing of the rent through taxation. Public 
economics acknowledges that economic rents are particularly desirable as a 
tax base, since they minimize distortions and deadweight losses.  
There are several rent extraction mechanisms and not all are conceived as taxes (for instance, in Norway, operators 
are forced to sell a percentage of their production at its cost). Watkins (2001) and Rothman (2000) give a complete 
overview of these mechanisms, which are not specific to the HE sector. Here, we will briefly discuss three extraction 
mechanisms: concession fee; revenue sharing and resource rent tax. All these extraction mechanisms are something 
that adds on top of “standard” taxation – namely, taxes that any business has to pay, such as corporate income tax or 
property taxes. 
Resource-based taxes may take the form of royalties or rent taxes, where the former more simply applies a rate to 
the quantity of resource extracted, possibly disregarding actual revenues and costs; while the base of the latter is the 
net rent that survives after accounting for all costs. 
The simplest and most common water royalty is the concession fee. In Italy, it assumes the form of a yearly lump-
sum payment, based on the “nominal production potential” (resulting from the average volume of granted water 
multiplied by the net hydraulic head). This type of fee is easy to compute and has almost no monitoring costs. At the 
same time, though, it has several drawbacks (Banfi et al., 2005): it is inflexible to price changes (meaning that if it is 
set too high it might rule out HE production, seizing the 100% or even more); it does not take into account differences 
in production sites; it is not neutral to investment decisions, as capital costs cannot be deducted. In turn, it stimulates 
cost saving and productivity maximization, since extra profits are left untaxed. 
Grantors might opt for a revenue sharing mechanism, which is a simple percentage of gross revenues calculated ex 
post. It is almost as easy to compute as the concession fee, but contrary to it, the revenue sharing mechanism 
internalizes price changes. On the other hand, it does not take into account differences in production sites and it is not 
neutral to investment decisions.  
A RRT, instead, is a tax levied on “extra profits”, that is profits that are above an “adequate” return on production 
factors. A concession scheme based on RRT is, from an economic point of view, the most efficient one, because it 
refers directly to the economic value of the resource and is neutral to investment decisions, because capital costs are 
taken into account and deducted from the taxable basis. 
Several arguments are raised to show the advantages of this approach with respect to royalties. Rent-extraction 
regimes concern allocation of the economic risk of resource development projects (Land, 2008). With this respect, RRT 
allows a more equitable sharing of risks that arise from external sources (e.g. market value of resources), while it also 
reduces the time-inconsistency problems associated to state regulation (Boadway and Keen, 2008). 
Tax design also matters: in order to achieve the greatest allocative benefits, RRT should be targeted at the project 
rate-of-return than at actual profits (Land, 2008). A further advantage concerns the possible existence of a tradeoff 
between rent maximization and social costs and benefits. Thisis typical of urban development projects, which may 
generate positive externalities or reduce negative ones (e.g. provision of public goods; urban landscape; traffic 
congestion) by renouncing to some development potential. Rent extraction via RRT favors the attainment of a socially 
desirable outcome, contrary to any royalty scheme. In turn, RRT compares negatively with royalties in terms of fiscal 
risk (i.e. variability of tax revenues) and administrative costs (Land, 2008).  
Only a few papers estimate the impact of different taxation mechanisms. Amundsen and Andersen (1992) simulate 
the impact of different taxation mechanisms on new hydro investments in Norway, showing that an RRT is the only 
extraction scheme to be neutral to investment decisions and the most appropriate in capturing the rent. Given the 
ongoing reform of the Italian hydroelectric institutional background, we want to test the effects of these different 
extraction mechanisms and show how an RTT favours the introduction of environmental mitigation measures. 
2.4 A brief description of the Italian HE sector 
In Italy HE accounts for 15% of total electricity production. In 2011, the production stood at 45.8 TWh. It is by far the 
most important renewable resource, accounting for 59% of RES installed capacity and 55% of energy produced from 
renewable sources. 
HE is a mature sector in which further developments are hardly achievable. Large facilities ( 4 10 MW) represent the 
largest share of the total production, accounting for more than 85%. 77% of capacity is concentrated in facilities 
having some upstream flow regulation capacity (Table 2). 
The regional distribution of HE installations is very uneven: 74% of the installed capacity resides in the Alpine region. 
The abundance of favorable sites results in lower costs and higher profitability for plants set in the North. As for the 
ownership, all the most important players have HE plants in their generation portfolio. Following the liberalization of 
the market, a power exchange is in operation since 2004, which intermediates approximately 60% of the total 
electricity produced; therefore it is very liquid and its price is representative (GME, 2013).  
Water and waterbeds belong to the public domain. Hence, the use of the resource is subject to a concession 
agreement. The licensee has to pay a fixed annual fee calculated on the basis of the nominal power capacity, plus 
further compensations to local communities whose territory is concerned by the project (Massarutto, forthcoming). 
Although this mechanism was supposed to drain a certain part of the rent, its amount was set at that time keeping 
into account the need to maintain the economic attractiveness for private developers. After the nationalization of the 
electricity sector in 1963 (De Paoli, 2001), the state preferred not to update the charges and let consumers instead 
benefit from the rent; this became de facto a sort of a clearing entry for the public budget. This situation remained 
crystallized for decades, but started to change with the liberalization of the electricity sector. At present, four driving 
forces assume paramount importance. 
First, the economic conditions are now completely different from one century ago, since assets are already in place 
and fully amortized; they may possibly need refurbishments and maintenance, sometimes revamping and 
rehabilitation, but this is likely to require only a fraction of the real initial investment. 
Second, in 1999, Regions have inherited State competences over the water domain; this devolution gave them the 
opportunity to set freely either the amount or the structure of abstraction charges. This causes a strong local 
variability on the amount of royalties collected. The range varies from a maximum of 35.05 €/kW of nominal power 
capacity in Molise and Basilicata to a minimum of 13.32 €/kW in Emilia Romagna; in Lombardy it is equal to 14.9 
€/kW. 
Third, due to budgetary constraints, and encouraged by delegation of fiscal powers, Local Governments are willing 
to capture a 
higher part of the rent; the political discourse about HE assumes in general that the actual patterns of rent sharing are 
unfairly favourable to HE companies, and this perception is reinforced by the mounting social consensus about the 
idea that water is a “common property of mankind” and its use should generate the maximum of benefits to the 
community as a whole.  
Fourth, many HE concessions are now expiring, and their reissue constitutes the occasion for updating the rules that 
discipline the formation and the allocation of the rent. Since EU internal market rules impede a mere renewal and 
require competitive procedures, a new discipline has been introduced, though not yet implemented. The law-decree 
of June 22, 2012, no. 83 introduces a tender process, which foresees that the new concession will last 20 years, and it 
requires petitioners to present: 
A technical offer: which means that candidates are expected to ameliorate the existing infrastructures in order to 
increase (if possible) the production.  
An environmental offer: within each project, petitioners have to show their actions to minimize their environmental 
impact.  
An economic offer: candidates are expected to present a financial business plan in which they will show the 
expected revenues and a revenue sharing percentage. 
As set forth in the decree, the economic offer is more important than the other two offers. As in France, Italy has 
decided that the 
economic offer takes the form of a revenue sharing percentage that does not replace the existing fees. We now study 
the effects of such renewal procedure in terms of rent generation, rent extraction and environmental mitigation 
measures in the County of Sondrio, that is where the fi rst concessions have expired. 
2.5 The case study area 
The County of Sondrio is geographically located in northern Lombardy, close to Switzerland. It is home of some 2.2 
GW of HE plants, roughly 18% of the overall Italian HE capacity. Of this 2.16 GW are big hydro schemes owned by four 
companies: A2A, Edipower, Edison and Enel. In the next four years all A2A and Edipower concessions will expire; by 
contrast Edison and Enel concessions will expire only in 2029. The oldest plants date back to the beginning of the 20th 
century, while the most recent ones were built in the fi f ties. Major refurbishments (mainly for the powerhouse) took 
place in the 80s for Edipower, in the 90s for Edison and Enel and at the beginning of 20 0 0 for A2A (Tables 3–6). 
A2A manages both the biggest plant and the second biggest one (which is 226 MW). As the data suggest, all 
operators manage HE schemes relying on one big plant to which smaller ones depend. In fact, as Fig. 1 shows, the 
overwhelming majority of the installed capacity are dams. Moreover, all run-of-the-river plants depend on the waters 
that are released from dams. In fact, all the plants are conceived as schemes as the released waters are turbinated 
more than once (Figs. 2–4).  
The overall amount paid by the operators in the County of Sondrio is 49.9 €/kW, which includes the basic 







2.6 Estimating production costs and revenues 
Operators did not release any information on costs. Still, we were able to construct a dataset on technical and 
concession-related variables for all HE plants currently operating in the County of Sondrio. The newly built dataset 
includes information on the location, the year of construction, the year of refurbishment, the average water flow, the 
net head, the nominal capacity, the installed capacity, the company that operates the plant and the yearly HE 
production of each plant. To estimate both investment costs and operation costs we opted for parametric 
approaches. We opted to estimate CAPEX as overnight investment costs for a greenfield project. This gives the 
possibility to take into account the long-run capital costs. In the parametric formulas all the components needed to set 
up a HE scheme are included, namely:  
• Project and licensing.  
• Dams or reservoirs (even the run-of-the-river plants in the County of Sondrio have at least a daily storage 
capacity).  
• Intakes, penstock s, surge chambers and outfl ow systems.   
• Turbines, generators, transformers and related powerhouse civil works. 
CAPEX were estimated with two equations to see if we would get similar results. The first approach stems from 
Kaldellis (2007), whose sample consisted of 50 small and medium Greek HE plants. Kaldellis' equation relates CAPEX 
with the net head and the installed power: 
 
where ξ is a value that has to be calibrated and that internalizes intangible expenses and specific market conditions; 
P is the installed power capacity in kW and H is the net head. For the calibration ofξ we used the only publicly 
available information on HE investment costs provided by GSE, the State-owned company that manages all the 
incentive programs for renewable energies. According to GSE (2010), the average CAPEX for dams bigger than 100 
MW are 2244 €/kW (real 2012 value); for small dams, instead, 2459 €/kW; finally CAPEX for small run-of-the-river 
plants (less than 20 MW) they sum up to 1924 €/kW. Consequently, in order tohave the same weighted average value 
from our sample, we have iteratively estimated the value ofξ and found it to be equal to 4.06. 
The second parametric approach, instead, was developed by Hall et al. (2003) and was tested on a sample from 267 
US plants. It is simpler than the first one as it relates CAPEX just to the installed capacity: 
 
where P is the installed capacity in MW. Hall et al. developed also a parametric approach to estimate also the 
refurbishment costs for the powerhouse equipment: 
 
results were seriously influenced by three big facilities in China, we have preferred to omit these from calculations1. 
As shown in the table below, both parametric estimations return similar results for average CAPEX (with a 19% 
difference) and the highest observation (8% difference). Both average values do not differ significantly from those 
reported by IRENA for small and medium hydro plants built in the EU (taking into account that only 6 out of 36 plants 
are bigger than 100 MW).  
More striking differences are found when comparing extreme values: this is due to the difference in the sample and 
to the fact 
that in the IRENA report some of the investments were, in fact, major refurbishments which cost less than greenfield 
ones. Still, Kaldellis' approach performs better for high CAPEX: this is so because it internalizes the head in its equation 
and there are significant economies of scale for heads above 50 m, as both suggested by Kaldellis et al. (2005) and 
shown in the graph below.  
Consequently, we have opted to keep the values found with Kaldellis' approach.  
As for OPEX, we have compared three different approaches. The first one being a parametric estimation, again from 
Hall et al., the other two being the above-mentioned surveys from GSE (2010) and IRENA (2012). Hall's formula relates 
fixed and variable OPEX to the installed capacity once the average production is known. IRENA instead estimates OPEX 
as a percentage of CAPEX and once again the average load factor has been defined. GSE, finally gives just a punctual 
value. As for the powerhouse, Hall's formulas gave consistent estimates with the survey performed by Alvarado-
Ancieta (2009).  
Moreover, the average value weighs from 16% to 19% of the overall investment costs presented above which is 
precisely the range reported by IRENA (2012). The table above shows that Hall's approach returns average OPEX 9% 
lower than the ones surveyed by IRENA. The punctual value found in the GSE report seems too high to be trustworthy. 
Once we have defined CAPEX and OPEX, we have to set the invested capital as well as an “adequate return”. As shown 
in Newbery (1997), the theory of accounting states that an asset, costing K at date n ¼0 that produces a flow of gross 
returns gn ceasing at date N, at any date n has a present value equal to the discounted sum (at a rate r) of its 
remaining returns so that:  
 
The amortization of an asset is simply its fall in value over its lifetime; differentiating (4), we obtain the 
instantaneous rate of amortization (An) 
 
From Eq. (5) it can be derived that 
 
which means that the gross return is made up of the return on the capital value at the beginning of each period, rVn, 
plus the amortization An.  
 
The amortization period has been set at 60 years for all civil works and at 40 years for the powerhouse equipment, 
consistent with the Italian accounting standards. 
The rate of return, instead, has been set at 7.6%, equal to the remuneration set by the Italian Authority on 
Electricity and Gas for all regulated activities. This is an intermediate value between those adopted by IEA et al. (2010) 
(where two “polar” rates, 5% and 10%, are used). While OPEX and amortization are time a-specific (in the sense that 
the value is the same, given the assumptions, whatever the time of investment), the cost of capital, calculated in this 
way, depends on the time of investment since the rate of return multiplies the residual net value of assets in each 
period. This choice allows “historicizing” the rent calculation (i.e. to refer it to a precise period).  
Table 7 summarizes the model output applied to the field data of each facility in the database, grouped according to 
the owner company. While A2A has a much higher cost of capital because it performed major refurbishments less 
than 10 years ago; moreover, some of the original assets have not been totally amortized yet. The estimation of 
revenues from the sale of HE on the power exchange would require detailed data on the temporary profile of sales, 
since the price varies significantly between peak and load periods. As pointed out in the introduction, HE generation 
from regulated flows is flexible enough to allow producers to concentrate activity in the most lucrative hours; 
however, due to technical and regulatory constraints, extreme hydro-peaking is not always feasible, and facilities 
could be obliged to release water also in load periods.  
Unfortunately, only yearly production data are available. Consequently, we have made two extreme estimates, 
using the average zonal price and the average peak zonal price of the power exchange. Rent estimations have been 
performed since 2004, the first year of operation of the power exchange, was 2011, the last year of available 
production data. Yearly prices have been converted into 2012 values using the electricity deflator of the harmonized 
index of consumer products. The mean values obtained are respectively 79.9 and 107.3 €2012/MWh. Given that almost 
all HE production in the County is programmable and that we expect operators to be profit maximizers, then it is likely 
that the overall rent is closer to our second estimate than to our first one. 
3. Results 
Table 8 displays the result obtained for each of the 4 companies, using respectively the normalized average and the 
peak zonal price. The value of the rent is considerable and much higher than those found in previous studies (see 
Table 2). In fact, even if we value HE production at the average price, the rent is comprised between 30.3–55.0 
€2012/MWh (average prices) and 57.7–82.4 €2012/MWh (peak prices).  
Clearly, the estimated value depends crucially on the fact that the Italian generation mix is particularly costly and 
unbalanced, since natural gas constitutes the marginal technology in the power exchange for almost 50% of the hours 
every year (GME, 2013).  
Table 9 illustrates the same calculation on an yearly basis, and the cumulative value for the entire period. We obtain 
an amount of 170–282 million euro per year and 1.36–2.26 billion euro for the whole period. Considering that our 
sample corresponds to 18% of total national HE production, a simple extrapolation allows to estimate an yearly 




4.1 Comparing alternative mechanisms 
As discussed in Section 2, there are many different ways to apportion the rent. In principle, it could be destined to 
the HE operator, in form of higher profits; to clients, if the price of electricity is set at the marginal cost; to the state, 
through taxes and fees charged on the operator; to the local community, either in cash or indirectly in the form of 
compensative measures; to the river environment, in the form of measures aimed at restoring the river ecology, and 
so on. Actual sharing patterns depend on institutional factors.  
In this paragraph, we compare the actual Italian fee system with the other two different extraction mechanisms 
described above, in order to show how this could affect the profitability for private operators, a major issue in the 
renewal procedure. In the table below, we show how, in practice, the rent is split between the State and the 
operators. In Italy, overall corporate taxation is equal to 31.4% of the taxable income; the revenue sharing has been 
set at 30% (as it has been proposed in France); the RTT at 30% as well, the same as in Norway. 
The current system has left a significant amount of the rent to private operators. On the other hand, all other things 
being equal, with the proportional system on top of the current one, the State would have seized almost all the rent. 
To be fair, also the RTT, coupled with the current fees, would have granted the State a significant amount of the rent, 
while not leaving a marginal slice to producers. This table shows why, on the one hand, the current system alone is 
not satisfactory for public bodies; on the other, it reveals why a proportional fee has been suggested. A system based 
just on concession fees does not fit a complex and liberalized electricity market, in which the price varies significantly, 
on an hourly basis. Clearly, a proportional system guarantees that also the State benefits from such price movements. 
The crucial point, of course, is to set a percentage that does not hinder the returns for private operators.  
The table also shows that, given the structure of the current system and the fixed percentages of both the 
proportional system and the RRT, as revenues increase, operators get a higher share of the rent; more, all three 
systems generate a threshold below which operators face a loss. For instance, with an average price lower than 77.6 € 
/MWh operators would lose money with the proportional revenue sharing mechanism; 58.9 € /MWh is the lowest 
threshold with a RTT; 54.3 € /MWh with the current system (Table 10).  
Considering that producers should be able to sell in peak hours, at first sight all these threshold prices seem 
unlikely, also taking into account the unbalanced Italian generation mix. At the same time, in the renewal procedure, 
operators are expected to invest, in particular in environmental mitigation measures. In Section 4.2, we show how the 
three different systems would affect such investment decisions. Before proceeding further, we present in Table 11 a 
sensitivity analysis on our results. The table above shows the effect and the magnitude of the variation of some crucial 
parameters. For instance, if we use Hall et al. (2003) parametric approach, that is an average 19% increase in CAPEX, 
we obtain a reduction in the total value of the rent. The reduction, though, is less than proportional (  7%), as a 
consistent portion of the CAPEX has been already amortized. Increasing OPEX has marginal effects, while the effects of 
a change in capital remuneration are more evident. In particular, reducing capital remuneration implies higher values 
for the estimated rent. For instance, if we use the current risk-free rate (the yield of the 10 years Italian Government 
bond), we obtain a 17% increase in the rent. Finally, Table 11 shows the impact of a reduction of the amortization 
period: even a consistent reduction (  20%) has marginal impacts on the rent. This happens because most of the assets 
have already been amortized (Table 12). 
4.2 The impact of environmental mitigation measures 
HE impacts the surrounding ecosystem. For instance, there is a wide literature on the impacts of HE production on 
biodiversity and ecosystem services (among others, Céréghino et al., 2002; Brown et al., 2007 and Renofalt et al., 
2010). These studies have a clear biological perspective: they study the impact of HE production management (in 
terms of, among others, minimal vital flows, hydro-peaking and sediment releases) on several biological indicators. All 
studies demonstrate that HE production significantly impacts both biodiversity and ecosystem services and, what is 
more important, they show that mitigation measures and a change in production management strategies can 




Moreover, many socially relevant alternative water uses have emerged in the meanwhile (e.g., tourism, fishing). The 
opportunity costs of developing sites and using water for HE are substantially different (higher) today; the renewal 
procedures are considered a good opportunity for implementing the requirements set forth in the Water Framework 
Directive (WFD), from the attainment of the “good ecological status” to the “users' pay principle”, all measures that 
will affect HE production.  
Mitigation measures vary from simple fish-passages to complex outflow reservoirs aimed at minimizing flow 
changes generated by hydro-peaking. Changes in production strategies normally mean to reduce flow alterations by 
means of re-nuturalization (Nilsson, 1996). This is in sharp contrast with the functioning of electricity markets, as 
intraday price volatility clearly implicates intraday production volatility. Investments for rehabilitation of existing 
facilities may offer an opportunity in this direction, since technically improved equipment can allow to maintain or 
increase the production potential while reducing environmental impacts (Goldberg and Lier, 2011). 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess and to monetize the environmental impacts of HE production in the 
County of Sondrio. Here we just would like to show how the proposed Brown et al., 2007 and Renofalt et al., 2010). 
These studies have a clear biological perspective: they study the impact of HE production management (in terms of, 
among others, minimal vital flows, hydro-peaking and sediment releases) on several biological indicators. All studies 
demonstrate that HE production significantly impacts both biodiversity and ecosystem services and, what is more 
important, they show that mitigation measures and a change in production management strategies can dramatically 
improve the quality of the surrounding environment.  
Moreover, many socially relevant alternative water uses have emerged in the meanwhile (e.g., tourism, fishing). The 
opportunity costs of developing sites and using water for HE are substantially different (higher) today; the renewal 
procedures are considered a good opportunity for implementing the requirements set forth in the Water Framework 
Directive (WFD), from the attainment of the “good ecological status” to the “users' pay principle”, all measures that 
will affect HE production.  
Mitigation measures vary from simple fish-passages to complex outflow reservoirs aimed at minimizing flow 
changes generated by hydro-peaking. Changes in production strategies normally mean to reduce flow alterations by 
means of re-nuturalization (Nilsson, 1996). This is in sharp contrast with the functioning of electricity markets, as 
intraday price volatility clearly implicates intraday production volatility. Investments for rehabilitation of existing 
facilities may offer an opportunity in this direction, since technically improved equipment can allow to maintain or 
increase the production potential while reducing environmental impacts (Goldberg and Lier, 2011).  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess and to monetize the environmental impacts of HE production in the 
County of Sondrio. Here we just would like to show how the proposed proportional system might reduce the scope for 
environmental investments. At present, operators in the County of Sondrio have not undertaken major mitigation 
measures. There are just some monitoring activities for the minimal vital flow requirement that has been introduced 
two years ago. As a consequence, in the renewal procedure bidders might commit themselves to signifi cant 
environmental investments. Using again a parametric estimation by Hall et al. (20 03),2, we have been able to estimate 
the costs of fish and wildlife mitigation investments and water quality monitoring equipment for all A2A and Edison 
plants, which will be subject to the tender procedure in the next four years. The table above shows that 
environmental investments are not negligible. For the plants managed by A2A, this would mean an overall investment 
of almost €108 million for those managed by Edison, instead, €48 million. Consequently, this would increase capital 
costs, in the short run, from 31.1 million to 43 million, dramatically changing all minimum thresholds. 
The figure below shows that under the current system, 61.6 €/MWh is the minimum average price that would 
guarantee the full repayment of all costs under the current fee system; with the RTT system, instead the threshold 
would increase to 67.9 €/MWh; finally, with the proportional system, it would rise to 87.9 €/MWh. 
This means that with the historical average price of 80.1 €/MWh, operators under the proportional system would 
not be able to repay their capital costs, unless they reduce by 7% the revenue sharing percentage, which would 
translate in €9 million for the State. This simple simulation shows the perverse effect of the proportional system on 
investment decisions in general and on environmental ones in particular. In fact, for a more environmentally friendly 
HE production, not only investments are needed, but operators should also opt for production patterns that minimize 
their impact on the flow. This reduces the scope for production in peak hours only, consequently reducing unitary 
revenue. Clearly, these are simplistic estimations that do not take into account variations in production nor a long run 
perspective. For instance, in the 8 years under study and for the two operators under consideration, production has 
varied from  24% to þ26% from the average. With the highest levels of production, which would mean working for 
2670 h instead of the average 2178 h used for the estimations, the thresholds would become: for thecurrent system, 
48.9 €/MWh; for the RTT system, 54.0 €/MWh; finally, for the proportional system, 69.9 €/MWh. Of course, 
production relies on precipitations, which would complicate further our simple estimations. 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
HE concession renewals are a major challenge for the Italian electricity market, as HE accounts for more than 15% of 
total electricity generation. In our paper we show that HE production generates the highest rent ever estimated, 
averaging from 30.3 €/MWh to 82.4 €/MWh. The unbalanced generation portfolio is the main source of such a rent. 
In the paper we also show that the current rent sharing mechanism is not satisfactory for local authorities, which keep 
less than 50% of the rent. Consequently, from an economic standpoint, the renewal procedure is an opportunity to 
redistribute the rent that HE generates: for instance, with the introduction of the proposed 30% proportional fee on 
revenues, almost 91% of the rent would accrue to local authorities.  
On the other hand, the WFD requires that all water bodies should attain a good ecological status by 2015 and that 
water users should pay its full cost, which means internalizing both environmental externalities and estimating the 
opportunity cost of the resource. Consequently, the renewal procedure is also the occasion to implement the 
requirements set forth in the WFD. To this respect, in this paper we show how environmental mitigation measures 
alone, which would significantly reduce flow alterations and would improve ecosystem integrity, entail considerable 
investments, therefore decreasing HE rentability. It is immediate to see that rent seizing and WFD requirements 
generate a trade-off, which has to be governed and solved. For instance, in our simulations we show that the 
implementation of such mitigation measures together with the proposed proportional fee might result in the 
impossibility either to carry out these investments, either to pay the fee. Our paper has straightforward policy 
implications: we suggest to partially revise the renewal procedure and to introduce a different taxation mechanism in 
order to seize the rent. As for the first issue, we think that within the framework of the competition, the economic 
offer should not have priority over the technical and the environmental offer. This explicitly puts a higher weight on 
rent seizing, increasing the risk of non-compliance with the WFD. To this respect, there is already a EU infringement 
proceeding against Italy for the fact that concession and renewal procedures are not compliant with the WFD, as they 
do not require an environmental impact assessment at a catchment level. 
Therefore we think that the provision of an environmental offer being less important than an economic offer might 
result in a second infringement proceeding.  
As for rent seizing, in the paper we show how a RRT is neutral to investment decisions, thus reducing the trade-off 
between rent maximization and environmental protection. Consequently, we suggest changing the current HE 
taxation system not by introducing a proportional fee, but by introducing a RTT similar to the one that has been 
adopted in Norway.  
Of course, our results depend on important assumptions with regard to CAPEX, OPEX and revenues. Hence, our 
results are a first approximation and require caution before immediate translation into policy. Future lines of research 
should go towards a more precise estimation of the HE rent both in the County of Sondrio and in Italy, by using hourly 
production data and real costs.  
Moreover, it would be necessary to better frame the trade-off between rent maximization and environmental 
protection by estimating the monetary value of environmental damages and internalizing it in each operator's cost 
function, by means of an ad hoc environmental fee. 
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